Fukuyama (2013) defines political development as the stable co-existence of the state, rule of law and accountability. A perfect balance of all three components is something Denmark has done, giving rise to the “getting to Denmark” catch phrase, for the attempts at replicating such. Such replication has proven difficult but Fukuyama notes that the necessary ingredients should include military competition to incentivise political reform and social mobilisation from economic progress, which encourage people to collaborate for collection action. Fukuyama also notes that political decay sets in when institutions become too rigid and when elitism causes the prioritisation of the interests of friends and family over that of the public, re-engaging patrimonialism. (The man himself presents on political decay and possible solutions in the contemporary context, here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAOVDl1bNXk). The political decay in developing countries are inextricably linked to colonial history, noted Fukuyama. That is, those former colonies with weak pre-existing institutions prior to the onslaught of colonisation tended to have greater political decay at the end of colonisation. I agree with this conclusion and think that it was perhaps instrumental in some of the different forms of “aid” that former colonisers extended at the end of colonisation. For example, preferential trade treatment for African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Such arrangements were gradually phased out and highly debated in discussions such as overdependence on aid, removal of incentive for efficiency, etc.
Duncan Green (2016, pp.84-85) concurred with Fukuyama, noting that African states were examples of countries with weak indigenous institutions. One of the interesting points about Fukuyama’s definition of political development is his conclusion that democracy is the regime that is necessary for political development to occur. This is interesting because some authors have noted that there is an absence of empirical evidence to show that democracy delivers better developmental outcomes than alternatives such as authoritarianism (eg. Carothers and de Gramont 2013).
Authoritarian is used interchangeably with autocracy and dictatorship. It is that system where leaders are not constitutionally bound to represent the interests of the people, according to the encyclopaedia of Britannia, cited by Kelsall (2014, p.3). The democratic system is that which elects leaders to represent the interest of the public, as governed by laws and regulations or other accepted norms. While some have assumed that it is a forgone conclusion that democracies produce good developmental results and autocracies do not, there is perhaps insufficient empirical evidence to make such a conclusion.
As noted by Carothers and de Gramont (2013, pp.64-66), successful states tended to be democracies and those which became democratic generally saw improved economic performance. In an “all good things go together” approach, democracy was assumed to be the main driver of successes and was deemed to be superior to autocratic systems. What of countries like Ethiopia and China? How does the theory explain the attainment of growth and development under autocratic systems? As Kelsall (2016, p.12) notes, authoritarian regimes have not exactly rushed to become democracies. Granted that prosperous authoritarian regimes are small in numbers, it still begs the question why the theory fails to explain their realities. As noted by Kelsall (2014, p.15), democracies tend to have a less volatile set-up than autocracies (although we sometimes conveniently forget that many years of wars preceded some democratic regimes) and the latter tend to be unsustainable in the longer-term and in low-income conditions. We can consult recent history for the “Arab Spring” to add context to this discussion. However, one should not conclude that developmental progress will be greater in one country if it is democratic, relative to another which is authoritarian, without the empirical evidence. Some, have however concluded that democracy is superior, such as this author who paints a picture of global war if authoritarian regimes were to “take over”: https://www.forbes.com/sites/anderscorr/2017/05/21/the-new-cold-war-democracy-vs-autocracy/#5e3d4b722fcd
Additionally, it may prove enlightening to assess the factors which contribute to the oft-times violent end of authoritarian regimes.
I’m by no means calling for more support for authoritarian regimes, but rather to make evidence-based decisions on political regimes. Having grown up in a democratic system I have no personal point of reference for an authoritarian regime but perhaps this is an area for further research, to find evidence of why autocracies generate development in one country but not another. It could also be interesting to investigate whether it would be useful to categorise regimes on a scale rather than binary system and whether the ideal system will be a mixture rather than any one extreme. After all, why should one group decide which version of a political regime is the standard, in the context of vastly different realities?
One important consideration in the paradigm of political regimes is accountability, as discussed by Fukuyama (2013) and Green’s (2016, pp.135-149) elaboration via discussion of the importance of political parties, social responsibility and the media in fostering accountability in states. These mechanisms discussed by Green will generally be present in democracies and should work towards protection of public interests but in cases where political decay set in, they may fail to do so. For example, the rapid development of social media platforms has significantly enhanced the spreading of ideas over the last decade, so much so that there have been many allegations that this platform was used to discredit political candidates in democracies such as the United States of America. Given considerations like these, it would be informative to explore whether the ideals of democracies are realized in the contemporary world and what becomes the major difference with an autocratic system, particularly in the context of economic and political development.
Reference List
Carothers, T. & Gramont, D. d., 2013. The door opens to politics. In: Development aid confronts politics: the almost revolution. Washington, D.C: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Ch 3.
Corr,
A., 2017. The new old war: democracy vs autocracy. [Online]
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[Accessed 16 February 2019].
Fukuyama, F., 2013. What is political development AND The dimensions of development . In: Political order and political delay From the industrial revolution to the globalisation of democracy . London: Profile Books Ltd, pp. 23-51.
Green, D., 2016. Accountability, Political Parties and the Media. In: How change happens. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 112-134.
Kelsall, T., 2014. Authoritarianism, Democracy and
Development. [Online]
Available at: http://publications.dlprog.org/SOTA3.pdf [Accessed 6
February 2019].
Kelsall,
T., 2016. What Happens to Economic Growth When High-Growth Autocracies
Become Democracies?. [Online]
Available at: http://publications.dlprog.org/kelsall_growth.pdf
[Accessed 15 February 2019].
RSA, T.,
2014. Francis Fukuyama on political decay. [Online]
Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XAOVDl1bNXk
[Accessed 16 February 2019].
